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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Petitioner disagrees with the statement in Respondent's
Brief at Page 35 that the evidence showed that "amphetamine sold in
powder form [is] (sic) an altogether different substance than that
sold in the pill form."

(R. 159). In fact, the testimony referred

to was by Kendra Herlin, a sheriff's undercover narcotics officer.
Her testimony was that there is a chemically slight difference
between pill amphetamines and crystallized amphetamine powder,
which a chemist would have to explain.

She also said that the

pills and powder are different in physical appearance, the pills
being a slightly off-white, brownish color, and the powder being
much more white.

(R. 159).

Petitioner believes this point is

important because the Tax Commission contends that pill and powder
amphetamines are different substances, justifying their different
treatment under the Stamp Tax, when there is no evidence to support
that conclusion.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The cases of United States v. Janis. 428 U.S. 433 (1976)
and I.N.S. v. Lopez-Mendoza. 468 U.S. 1032 (1984) provide guidance
in the application of a balancing test which can provide one reason
for application of the exclusionary rule in this proceeding.
However, neither case controls on the facts of this case.

Janis

was the result of a determination that deterrence would not be

2
furthered by applying the exclusionary rule in an intersovereign
situation. The situation in this case is intrasovereign involving
an unconstitutional seizure by state law enforcement officers and
an attempt to utilize the goods seized in a tax proceeding by the
State Tax Commission.

I.N.S. v. Lopez-Mendoza held that the

exclusionary rule should not be applied to civil deportation
proceedings because the application of the rule would allow the
commission of an ongoing crime, because the INS has adequate
procedures to protect against Fourth Amendment violations, and
because

the

cost

of

imposing

the

rule

in

the

streamlined

deportation hecirings would be too high.
This case is distinguishable, and the balancing test of
Janis applied in this case indicates that the exclusionary rule
should apply.

County sheriffs and the State Tax Commission are

different arms of the same sovereign. The Tax Commission has power
to direct and receive information from the county sheriffs.

Each

is concerned with application of the laws of the State of Utah.
And recent history shows that the power to exact large taxes or to
seize funds or to forfeit properties are regularly used as one of
the primary efforts in law enforcement, particularly regarding the
possession of controlled substances. Because of that, application
of the exclusionary

rule

in this proceeding will provide a

significant deterrent effect.

3
On the other hand, there is nothing to indicate that the
costs outweigh the benefits of deterrence.

Application of the

exclusionary rule would not result in any ongoing violations. Tax
Commission

hearing

officers

are or can

become

competent

to

determine these issues, they have not been shown to impose any
burden which would prohibit consideration of such issues, nor has
it been shown that such issues would be raised on any large scale.
A second and separate basis for application of the
exclusionary rule in this proceeding is that the Illegal Drug Stamp
Tax is, in fact, a quasi-criminal statute like the civil forfeiture
statute found to require the application of the exclusionary rule
in One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania. 380 U.S. 693 (1965).
The tax is not even applicable without violation of the criminal
law regarding possession of controlled substances, and the tax
imposed can be and is, in this case, far greater than the fines
which could be imposed for violation of the criminal provisions of
the law. The tax imposed is also approximately 150 times the value
of the amphetamines which were seized, making the Drug Stamp Tax an
even harsher penalty than forfeiture.

These are the elements the

Supreme Court has used to determine a quasi-criminal statute, and
because they are present in this case, the exclusionary rule should
apply.

4
Finally, because the violation of Fourth Amendment rights
in this case was egregious, involving a roadblock set up at the
whim of five sheriff/s deputies on patrol, and where there is no
case law which would support the constitutionality of such a roadblock, this Court should hold that it would transgress the notions
of fundamental fairness to employ the evidence seized as a result
against Petitioner in this proceeding. For this reason, also, the
exclusionary rule should apply.
This Court should also apply an exclusionary rule for
violation of the Utah constitutional provisions governing search
and seizure. Such a result is appropriate because the application
of the exclusionary rule in a proceeding such as this is not wellsettled, and because Drug Stamp Tax proceedings are unique Utah
proceedings

which

should

be

limited

by

Utah

constitutional

provisions.

Other states have imposed an exclusionary rule under

their own constitutions, which is sometimes broader than the
federal rule,.

Like those cases, the exclusionary rule should be

applied in this case because of the violation of Article I,
Section 14 of the Utah Constitution.
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ARGUMENT
I.
THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE APPLIES IN THIS PROCEEDING
BECAUSE OF THE VIOLATION OF FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS
A.

United States v. Janis and U . S . v. Lopez-Mendoza are Distinguishable, and the Balancing Test They Employ Indicates the
Exclusionary Rule Should Apply in Illegal Drug Stamp Tax
Proceedings.
The United States Supreme Court held in United States v.

Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976) (hereinafter "Janis"), that evidence
obtained by state law enforcement officers pursuant to a search
warrant later proved to be defective was admissible in a federal
civil tax proceeding, and that the exclusionary rule would not
apply.

The facts of this case are distinguishable.

First, this

case involves an intra-sovereign violation, where the State of Utah
attempts to use evidence obtained in violation of Fourth Amendment
rights by the State's own officers.
government
officers.

attempted

to

utilize

In Janis, the federal

evidence

This was a major factor

obtained

by

state

in the Supreme Court's

assessment of the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule. The
Court stated:
The additional marginal deterrence provided by
forbidding a different sovereign from using
the evidence in a civil proceeding surely does
not outweigh the cost to society of extending
the rule to that situation. Janis, supra at
453-54.
Janis argued that the application of the rule to civil
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proceedings has long been recognized in the federal courts, citing
cases including United States v. Blank, 261 F.Supp. 180 (N.D. Ohio
1966); Pizzarello v. United States, 408 F.2d 579 (2nd Cir. 1969),
cert, denied, 396 U.S. 986, and Suarez v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue1, 58 T.C. 792 (1972), which are relied on by Petitioner in
this case as well.

With regard to those cases, the Supreme Court

stated as follows:
[RJespondent does not critically distinguish
between those cases in which the officer
committing the unconstitutional search or
seizure was an agent of the sovereign that
sought to use the evidence, on the one hand,
and those cases, such as the present one, on
the other hand, where the officer has no
responsibility or duty to, or agreement with,
the sovereign seeking to use the evidence.
The seminal cases that apply the exclusionary
rule to a civil proceeding involve "intrasovereign" violations, a situation we need not
consider here. Janis, supra at 455-56.
Vander Linden v. United States, 502 F.Supp. 693 (S.D.
Iowa 1980) was decided after Janis and held that the exclusionary
rule did apply in a federal tax proceeding to suppress evidence
^he Tax Commission argues that the holding in Suarez v.
Commissioner has been expressly overruled by Guzzetta v.
Commissioner, 78 T.C. 173 (1982). However, Guzzetta only limited
the application of Suarez to situations involving intrasovereign
violations. The Tax Court stated, "In situations involving intersovereign violations of the Fourth Amendment, such as the case now
before us, United States v. Janis, supra, controls. To the extent
that Suarez is inconsistent with Janis with respect to the
application of the exclusionary rule, we will no longer follow our
prior decision," Guzzetta v. Commissioner, supra, 184.

7
illegally obtained by the Internal Revenue Service.

The District

Court stated:
The facts of the matter now before the Court
are distinguishable from those in Janis in
that the facts of this matter involve "intrasovereign" violations while in Janis the
situation
concerned
an
"intersovereign"
situation. . . .
This Court is of the opinion that the
"deterrent effect" in an "intrasovereign"
situation would be furthered by excluding
illegally obtained evidence in subsequent
civil trial proceedings. Id. at 697.
The

Tax

Commission

attempts

to

distinguish

Vander

Linden v. U.S., supra, as well as Pizzarello v. U.S., supra, and
U.S. v. Blank, supra, because those cases involved exclusion in a
federal tax proceeding of evidence illegally obtained by federal
agents. The Tax Commission attempts to distinguish these cases by
stating that Utah County is a different sovereign than the State
Tax

Commission.

(Brief

of

Respondent

at

19).

The

Tax

Commission contends that the evidence illegally seized should not
be excluded because the Commission was not involved in the illegal
seizure.

(Brief of Respondent at 24).
In fact, this case involves an intrasovereign violation,

like the cases relied on by Petitioner.

County sheriffs and the

State Tax Commission are each part of the same sovereign—the State
of Utah.

County sheriffs enforce the laws of the State of Utah.

Defendants who they arrest are charged for crimes by the State of

8
Utah.

The county attorney prosecutes those defendants for the

State of Utah. Counties are created and given their powers by the
state legislature.

Utah Code Annotated, Title 17, Chapter 5.

The county is a part of the state and is
subject to the control of the legislature.
Hansen v. Public Employees' Retirement System
Bd. of Admin. . 122 Utah 44, 61, 246 P.2d 591
(1952).
Further, county sheriffs and other county officers are by
statute agents of the Tax Commission for enforcement of the tax
laws. Utah Code Annotated § 59-1-210 gives the Tax Commission the
following powers:
(9)
to confer with, advise, and direct . . .
county officers in matters relating to . . .
the collection of taxes; . . .
(14) . . . to require from all state and
local officers any information necessary for
the proper discharge of the duties of the
commission.
Not only are county sheriffs and the State Tax Commission
parts of the same sovereign State of Utah, but the Tax Commission
may require sheriffs to provide information to the Tax Commission
and

may

direct

county

collection of taxes.

sheriffs

in matters

relating

to

the

The Tax Commission's attempt to distinguish

the federal cases relied on by Petitioner fails because the county
sheriffs and the State Tax Commission are bound by an agency
relation in respect to collection of taxes and are each part of the
same sovereign.
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The Tax Commission also relies on I.N.S. v. LopezMendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984) (hereinafter "Lopez-Mendoza") to
support its contention that the exclusionary rule should not apply
in this proceeding.

In that case, the Supreme Court held that the

exclusionary rule does not apply in civil deportation proceedings
for

illegal

immigrants.

Lope z-Mendo za

did

involve

an

intrasovereign violation, where INS agents unlawfully arrested the
defendants and obtained their admissions of alienage.

However,

contrary to the Tax Commission's assertion, the Supreme Court did
not hold that the exclusionary rule would not apply in any civil
proceedings.

The decision is limited to the facts of the case

involving civil deportation proceedings.

The Court stated that

Janis "set forth the framework for deciding in what types of
proceeding application of the exclusionary rule is appropriate.
Imprecise as the exercise may be, the Court recognized in Janis
that there is no choice but to weigh the likely social benefits of
excluding unlawfully seized evidence against the likely causes.11
Lopez-Mendoza, supra at 1042.
On the benefits side of the balance, the question is the
extent of deterrence of unlawful police conduct.

Several of the

factors relied on by the Supreme Court in Lopez-Mendoza as reducing
the

likely value of the exclusionary

rule

proceeding are distinguishable from this case.

in a deportation
First, the Court

10
held that deportation would still be possible if the exclusionary
rule is applied by the use of other evidence. In this case, where
the

substances

to

be

taxed

were

found

as

a

result

of

an

unconstitutional seizure, the tax will not be applied if the
exclusionary rule is applied.

The Court also felt the deterrence

would be minimal because "the INS has its own comprehensive scheme
for deterring Fourth Amendment violations by its officers." Id. at
1044. There is no evidence of a similar effort by Utah County, and
in this case there is clear evidence that any training has been
ineffective

because

of

the

unconstitutional

actions

of

the

sheriff's deputies in instituting the roadblock involved here.
This case is also distinguishable from Lopez-Mendoza on
the cost side of the balancing test.

The Court said:

The first cost is one that is unique to
continuing violations of the law. Applying
the exclusionary rule in proceedings that are
intended not to punish past transgressions but
to prevent their continuance or renewal would
require the courts to close their eyes to
ongoing violations of the law. Id. at 1046.
Application of the rule in deportation proceedings would allow an
illegal immigrant to continue violation of the immigration law by
his presence in the country.
The cidministrative burden of applying the exclusionary
rule in INS proceedings was also a factor. The Court noted that an
INS agent may make many arrests each day, and that immigration

11
judges average six deportation hearings per day.

The State Tax

Commission has not shown any such volume of cases.

There is no

reason it could not adequately consider the exclusionary rule in
the few Drug Stamp Tax cases it is actually called upon to handle.
Application of the balancing test in this case shows that
the deterrent benefits of application of the exclusionary rule in
Drug Stamp Tax cases outweigh the costs. First, there is likely to
be a deterrent benefit from application of the rule. In Janis, the
Supreme Court said that concern over inadmissibility at a federal
proceeding

was

unlikely

to

provide

significant

additional

deterrence because the offending officer's zone of primary interest
is not the federal law. Janis, supra at 458. The zone of interest
of county sheriffs is to enforce the laws of the State of Utah.
This includes criminal laws, including violation of the criminal
provisions of the Drug Stamp Tax.

It also includes the county

sheriff's obligations to provide information requested by the Tax
Commission and to act under directions by the Tax Commission in
matters relating to the collection of taxes. The imposition of the
Drug Stamp Tax is also within the practical zone of interest of the
county sheriff's officers.

The high taxes and penalties payable

are an inducement to Fourth Amendment violations. Recent publicity
regarding money seized and taxes imposed as a result of police
seizures in drug cases demonstrates the importance attached to such
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actions, not only by law enforcement but by the public in general.
Deprivation of a suspect's funds and assets has became an important
aspect of law enforcement. The Illegal Drug Stamp Tax is a weapon
in the drug war, and sheriffs and other law enforcement are frontline combatants in that war.

Having been given the weapon, they

will use it to take any action they can to punish a person found
with drugs.

Putting constitutional limits on the use of that

weapon will deter future unconstitutional searches and seizures by
eliminating the* inducement to utilize unconstitutional searches and
seizures as a vehicle to impose the tax.
This case is an example of that fact. Here there was an
unconstitutional
unreasonable
highway.

roadblock

violating

the

rights

against

search and seizure of every person traveling a

If the exclusionary

rule does not

apply

in this

proceeding, this Court would sanction such methods as a means of
insuring compliance with the Illegal Drug Stamp Tax or other tax
laws. The ability to cause the financial ruination of a person by
imposition of the Drug Stamp Tax by virtue of evidence from an
illegal search or seizure could furnish substantial incentive by
providing the perception of success to law enforcement personnel,
even

if

the

proceedings.

evidence

seized

were

inadmissible

in

criminal

Without the application of the exclusionary rule in

Drug Stamp Tax proceedings, there is nothing to prevent the Tax

13
Commission from requesting, directing, or just tacitly encouraging
law enforcement officers to establish unconstitutional roadblocks
or initiating other unconstitutional searches for the primary or at
least collateral purpose of enforcing the Drug Stamp Tax.

The

state should not be able, in a case involving unconstitutionally
obtained evidence, to choose to proceed under the civil tax rather
than the criminal law and thereby utilize illegally seized evidence
to impose a tax far in excess of any fines available for the
related criminal violations in any event.
The costs of imposing the exclusionary rule in cases like
this do not outweigh the deterrent benefits which would be realized
by its application.

First, the costs to society are not as great

as in a criminal case.

The exclusionary rule would not result in

letting a criminal go free, just a prohibition of collection of a
tax which has not been shown to result in significant revenue for
the state in any event.
The Court in I.N.S. v. Lopez-Mendoza, supra, indicated
that the exclusionary rule should be applied where egregious
violations of Fourth Amendment rights occur, which transgress
notions of fundamental fairness. Lopez-Mendoza, supra at 1050-51.
Therefore, the Tax Commission will require some mechanism for
determining egregious violations of the Fourth Amendment.
additional

burden

of

determining

a violation

of

the

The

Fourth

14
Amendment, rather than an egregious violation, is small.

Also,

there will often be a prior determination in a criminal court of
the constitutionality of the search and seizure which would be
binding upon the parties in the tax proceeding.

As pointed out

above, unlike the situation in Lopez-Mendoza, the application of
the exclusionary rule will not result in any continuing crime or
violation. No one questions the right of law enforcement to seize
and not return contraband.
indicate

that

hearing

There is also nothing in this case to

officers

of

the

Tax

Commission

are

overburdened or face anything approaching the case load of the INS
administrative law judges. There is no reason why the factual and
legal issues of search and seizure law could not be adequately
handled by the hearing officers of the Tax Commission.

And there

is nothing to indicate that the burden of doing so or that the
volume of cases in which such issues would be raised would be
great.

For these reasons, the balancing test propounded in Janis

and applied in Lopez-Mendoza produces a different result in this
case and indicates that the deterrent values of applying the
exclusionary rule exceed the costs.
B.

The Exclusionary Rule Should be Applied to Illegal Drug Stamp
Tax Proceedings Because They are Quasi-Criminal.
In fact, the exclusionary rule has been applied by the

United States Supreme Court in one type of civil proceeding—
forfeitures. One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693

(1965) (hereinafter "One Plymouth Sedan"), In that case, the Court
stated:
A forfeiture proceeding is quasi-criminal in
character.
Its object, like a criminal
proceeding, is to penalize for the commission
of an offense against the law. . . . It would
be
anomalous
indeed,
under
these
circumstances, to hold that in the criminal
proceeding the illegally seized evidence is
excludable,
while
in
the
forfeiture
proceeding, requiring the determination that
the criminal law has been violated, the same
evidence would be admissible. Id. at 700-701.
This holding was noted and approved in Janis.
States v. Janis, supra at 447.

United

With regard to what is a quasi-

criminal proceeding, the Court in One Plymouth Sedan stated as
follows:
The information, though technically a civil
proceeding, is in substance and effect a
criminal one. . . . A s , therefore, suits for
penalties and forfeitures incurred by the
commission of offences against the law, are of
this quasi-criminal nature, we think that they
are within the reason of criminal proceedings
for all the purposes of the Fourth Amendment
of the Constitution. One 1958 Plymouth Sedan
v. Pennsylvania, supra at 697-98, quoting Boyd
v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 633-34.
Just as forfeiture proceedings are quasi-criminal, so is
the Drug Stamp Tax.

Each requires that for the penalty to be

exacted, whether a forfeiture or an oppressive tax of 150 times the
value of the substance seized, a finding of the commission of an
offense is required.

The Illegal Drug Stamp Tax specifically
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states:

"Nothing in this chapter requires persons lawfully in

possession of marihuana or a controlled substance to pay the tax
required under this chapter."

U.C.A. § 59-19-107(2).

case, the amount of the tax assessed was $22,000.

In this

This tax is

greater than the maximum fine available for criminal violation of
the Drug Stamp Tax.

U.C.A. § 59-19-106(2).

In United States v. Blank. 261 F.Supp. 180 (N.D. Ohio
1966), the District Court applied the ruling and reasoning of the
Supreme Court in One Plymouth Sedan, to a tax case involving the
application of the federal excise tax on gambling activities. The
Court noted as follows:
Where, as here, there is a correlative civil
action open to the Government which imposes a
penalty upon the citizen commensurate with the
criminal sanctions to which an accused,
victimized by an illegal search, would be
exposed, then we see no distinguishable
difference between the two forms of punishment
which excuses the government from complying
with constitutional mandates when prosecuting
their action in a civil forum. Were this not
the case, all suspected violators of revenue
laws would be subject to the precise evil at
which the Fourth Amendment is directed—the
unreasonable disruption of the privacy of the
home—no matter how slim or unfounded might be
the suspicion of their illegal activity. If
there is no constitutional check on the
"investigative"
efforts
of
federal
administrative officials prosecuting civil
claims, and there exist forfeiture and
deficiency proceedings, civil in form, which
inflict an onerous monetary penalty upon an
accused which approximates the visitations of
the criminal code, there is no practical

restraint upon such officials.
v. Blank, supra at 182.

United States

In concluding that the exclusionary rule should apply In
that tax case, the Court stated:
Our decision today follows necessarily from
the reasoning explicitly expressed by the
Supreme Court in One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v.
Com, of Pennsylvania. Id. at 183.
The

Tax

Commission

has

determining whether a proceedim

argued

the

test

for

? quasi-criminal in character for

1
Plymouth

that

>Lciusionary rule under
Sedan should

statute, civil i r>

5

—

test
•

crirniruil si i,it.ute -iiav. i u*.
tJ , K. 144 (196 3 ) ,

*:

One

whether

should

a
a

t Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372

Petitioner has discussed these factors at pp. 46-

47 of the Brief of IV t it IUIKMI

MI MI IN

more stringent than the test for

i.'a:...* , in IW<»VII» m , Midi itehi is

whether a statute

criminal for purposes of applying the exclusionar
cc -

iendment

Is quasiuxe.

Some

privilege against

double jeopardy, and the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, can only
be violated if there is a criminal proceeding.

But; tiip" Fourth

Amendmei i t ri ght against unreasonable searches and seizures can be
violated whether or not a criminal proceeding ensues,
into the Kennedy v •_ Mendo z a -Mar t i ne z £ a • "* t o r s d - ^ ••
w h e t h e r t h e suit is q u a s i - c r i m i n a l ,

~

inquiry
- • e t: in .i. ne

In U n i t e d States v . W a r d , 448

18
U.S. 242 (1980), which has been cited by both Petitioner and
Respondent, the issue was whether a requirement that discharges of
oil into navigable waters be reported violated the privilege
against self-incrimination because it could lead to a civil penalty
for the discharge.

After first determining that the Kennedy v.

Mendoza-Martinez factors did not indicate that the statute imposing
the civil penalty was, in fact, criminal, the Court went on as
follows:
Our conclusion that § 311(b)(6) does not
trigger all the protections afforded by the
Constitution to a criminal defendant does not
completely dispose of this case. Respondent
asserts that, even if the penalty imposed upon
him was not sufficiently criminal in nature to
trigger other guarantees, it was "quasicriminal,"
and therefore
sufficient
to
implicate the Fifth Amendment's protection
against compulsory self-incrimination. United
States v. Ward, supra at 251.
This issue involved interpretation and application of
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), a case which was also
relied upon by the Court in One Plymouth Sedan. The Supreme Court
in United States v. Ward quoted the Boyd opinion as follows:
As, therefore, suits for penalties and
forfeitures incurred by the commission of
offences against the law, are of this quasicriminal nature, we think that they are within
the reason of criminal proceedings for all the
purposes of the Fourth Amendment of the
Constitution, and of that portion of the Fifth
Amendment which declares that no person shall
be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself. . . . United States

v. Ward. supra at 252, quoting Boyd v. United
States at 634.
Although the Court went on in United States v. Ward to
find that *

penalty imposed

- discharge of oi1 in navigable

waters wa

<* na 1 ys i s

I the C :)ii :IL:I : t: m a k e s

clear t h a t the seven factors stated in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez
do n o t control w h e t h e r a civil penalty is so far quasi-criminal a s
t ::> :i .nvoke the pro tec I:

-

amendment a n d the Fifth

A m e n d m e n t right against self-incrimination.
This Court should recognize that t h e Illegal Drug Stamp
r

;

l.

Its object

Is to penalize

for the

commission of the offense of possession of controlled substances.
The tax cannot be applicable w:i thoi I t: £ « :i o] a I

the : x:i in :i nal

] aw, and the tax itself far exceeds the maximum fine? m a criminal
proceeding for either the possession of controlled substances or
for

i T i.m i n.ii I > :i o l a t: * »",» » < »

this f o r assessment
require

, Hroceed i ntjs such as
Illegal Drug Stamp T a x w i l l

3 "inding t h a t t w o criminal

I

laws h a v e b e e n

always

vio.-^ed.

possession o f controlled

substances and, second, the criminal provisions of the Illegal Drug
Stamp

T a x A c t itself.

F I M »h<?si>

reasons,

I hi,1- Cour,"

should

recognize t h a t , regardless of the results of b a l a n c i n g u n d e r t h e
Janis

test

discussed

s u p r a , t h e exclusionary

proceed i h-'f' ""intlei U n " lll"'|.il MiU'-i SI-imp "'

rule

applies to

. because "it i« in
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fact, a quasi-criminal proceeding in its character.

For these

reasons, this Court should hold that the exclusionary rule applies
to Drug Stamp Tax proceedings.
C.

The Exclusionary Rule Should Apply in this Proceeding Because
of the Egregious Nature of the Violation of Fourth Amendment
Rights.
The Supreme Court in I.N.S. v. Lopez-Mendoza, supra. in

holding that the exclusionary

rule does not apply to civil

deportation proceedings, noted:
We do not deal here with egregious violations
of Fourth Amendment or other liberties that
might transgress notions of fundamental
fairness and undermine the probative value of
the evidence obtained. Id. at 1050-51.
The Court indicated that where egregious violations
occur, the exclusionary rule should apply.

For that reason, as

well, the exclusionary rule should apply in this proceeding.

The

roadblock in this case occurred ten years after Delaware v. Prouse,
440 U.S. 648 (1979).

In the intervening years, dozens of cases

have interpreted that watershed Supreme Court decision with regard
to roadblock seizures. Petitioner has not found one case in which
a roadblock set up in the discretion of officers in the field has
been held to be constitutional.

The Tax Commission apparently

concedes this issue, having not even addressed it in the Brief of
Respondent in this case.
egregious

violation

of

The roadblock at issue here is an
Fourth

Amendment

rights,

not

only

21
Petitionee .-,« I'til also a 1.1 other drivers on the roads of Utah
officers on patrol decided amongst themselves to institute A
roadblock, the effect -

. ..utionally seize

every vehicle which happened alone

Let-* was.- no warrant obtained,
officers regard! i iti trie

no direction from administrative
establishment

-1, m.'i'\i

believes the facts

;.:

-s

Petitioner

constitute : egregious violation

such that the use of the evidence obtained by virtue of the sei zure
would transgress notions of I: undamental fairness. For that reason,
also, this Court should hold that the exclusionary rule should be
applied

should clarify the stilus1

•

*Y\

.

r e * J- • •

»#

II.
THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE APPLIES IN THIS PROCEEDING
BECAUSE OF THE VIOLATION OF RIGHTS SECURED UNDER
ARTICLE I, SECTION 14 OF THE UTAH CONSTTTTJTION
Petitioner argued in his earlier brief that the roadblock
in this case was unconstitutional under Article I , hpction i i of
the Uta>
Constitution.

-jer the United

States

However, the issue of the application of the

exclusionary rule for

r

olations of the Utah " 'mist™ 11 u1 i oh was

separately .id dressed. The .^v Commission cites the Court to State
v.

Aime, 62 Utah

exclusionar

-

!

. 704

(1923) (

which

Im-itJ

i hit

needing where evidence was

obtained

in violation of Article

Constitution«

I, Section 14 of the Utah

State v. Aime has never been expressly overruled•

However, in State v. Louden. 15 Utah 2d 64, 66, 387 P. 2d 240
(1963), this Court stated:
We have no disposition to disagree with the
doctrine that where police officers have
obtained evidence by illegal methods, such as
unlawful search in violation of the IV
Amendment to the United States Constitution
and Article I, Sec. 14 of our Constitution, it
should not be used to convict a person of
crime, as held by the United States Supreme
Court in the case of Mapp v. Ohio. Although
there are admittedly older decisions of this
Court which indicate that under certain
circumstances, evidence even though unlawfully
obtained, may be used as evidence.
The Court in Louden appears to adopt the exclusionary
rule for violations of Article I, Section 14 in the case of
criminal proceedings, thus implicitly disapproving State v. Aime.
This Court's recent pronouncement of interest in a separate Utah
constitutional jurisprudence regarding Article I, Section 14 of the
Utah Constitution, cited in Petitioner's brief at Page 25, also
indicates the tacit assumption that the exclusionary rule applies
for violations of Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution.
This Court should rule that the exclusionary rule applies
in this Drug Stamp Tax proceeding because the controlled substances
on which the tax is assessed were discovered as the result of a
seizure which was unconstitutional under the Utah Constitution.
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one reason toi. this Court to so rule i s that, there is no definitive
statement from the U.S. Supreme Court

*<="^.

arguments and reasor
with regard

hr

The policy

*ppiy equally
application

violation

u\

exclusionary rule for

Constitution

* Stamp

proceeding,

..

our

Tax
D

rule on the application of the exclusionary rule here because the
Drug Stamp Tax is a unique Utah statutory provision whicli m,iy" not
he analoqouu. l.o ..iny provisions on whioh I lie li S Supreme Court may
eventually rule.
Unfortunately, there is v&- y m t i e
jurisprudeno I,J" on Llii.i\ question,.

However, there are cases from

other states which provide guidance.

First, before Mapp v. Ohio,

367 u.o. otj o ^ 0 1 /

!

proceedings, there was a spl I t of authority among the states as to
whether the exclusionary rule applied
constitutional provisions

for violation of state

This split ni authority was d iscussed

by this Court in State v. Aime, supra. More recently, other states
have

held

the

exclusionary

rule

to

be

»c':r-

proceedi i lgs * h< = i: e sta tie cons11tutiona 1, r igUt * regarding search ir n
seizure have been violated.

The Oklahoma Supreme Court

,L, -I~

that under the Oklahoma ''onsr't i tuHon I ho i x<
in

civil

and

criminal

cases.

Turner

v.

i?

City

of

Lawton.
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733 P.2d 375 (Okl. 1986). The courts of Washington have held that
the exclusionary rule is more restrictive under the Washington
Constitution than the federal exclusionary rule, and have applied
the exclusionary rule to probation revocation hearings.

State v.

Lampman, 45 Wash.App. 228, 724 P.2d 1092 (1986).
The Tax Commission cites the Court to County of Henrico
v. Ehlers, 379 S.E.2d 457 (Va. 1989) as a state court which has
refused to apply the exclusionary rule in civil cases.

That case

dealt with whether the exclusionary rule should apply in an
interpleader

action,

a

situation

much

different

from

this

proceeding. Also, that case did not deal with state constitutional
law, but interpreted only the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.

Contrary to the Virginia Court, the courts of New

York have held that evidence unconstitutionally seized for the
purpose of a criminal

investigation may not be subsequently

utilized in a civil proceeding.

See Ryan v. Manhattan & Bronx

Surface Transit Operating Authority, 466 N.Y.S.2d 879, 120 Misc.2d
524 (1983), and cases cited therein.
For

the

reasons

stated,

and

like

the

courts

of

Washington, Oklahoma, and New York, this Court should hold that the
exclusionary rule applies in Drug Stamp Tax proceedings where the
substance

to

Constitution.

be

taxed

is

seized

in violation

of

the Utah
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CONCLUSION
For the r e a s o n s s t a t e d h e r e i n , P e t i t i o n e r
thi s < "lon il In in 11 in I mid i I in nyc I un i onary
Staiap
Section

Tax

proceedings
rights

have

tr •
Fourth

where
been

Fourth

Petitioner

.
Amendment

and

Article

that

nil I e app J j es i in 1 1 legs , Trncr

Amendment

violated

requests

or

Article

requests

that

.s case violated both the
I,

Section

14

of

the

Utah

Constitution, for the reasons stated in the Brief of Pet.i 1.1 a runner contests and disagrees with many of
the assertions and arguments made by the Tax Commission regarding
other issues in this case, Petitioner" i>el ieves M naf h is ear I iei;
briet adequately addresses and anticipates the Tax Commission's
arguments. Therefore, Petitioner believes those issues need not be
addressed HUM I II IMII r r»f * * i \ tiio imiil hi 111:» oaf Iiei brief.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

it

day of February, 1990.

RICHARDS, BIRD & KDMP

a V ',

David J / B i r d
Attorneys for Petitioner

26
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that the foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF
PETITIONER was served this

IP

day of February, 1990, by mailing

four (4) true and correct copies hereof, postage prepaid, addressed
to the following:
Lee A. Dever
Assistant Attorney General
130 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

